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THE NATIONAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM: A MARKET
INSTITUTION AT THE CROSSROADS
ANTOANETA GEAL˘ A
Abstract. The safety net provided by deposit insurance systems gain heavily in weight at
times of crisis. The correct set of such a cushion is critical to its eﬀectiveness. While it
helps to prevent bank runs, the severe market distortions are of great concern. The short
term beneﬁt of public conﬁdence can be, far and away, oﬀset by its long run negative eﬀects
consisting mainly in increased moral hazard, heavy public costs and impaired competition.
1. Introduction
Largely challenged worldwide, stability and safety of ﬁnancial system are being a hot spot
as regulators and governments are very active in their search for solutions to sort out the
current crisis which wiped out the public conﬁdence. In addition to the critical role of banking
regulatory framework and supervision in delivering a reliable and stable banking system, an
established framework of deposit insurance is being widely recognized as an important pillar of
ﬁnancial stability.
The current article is trying to elaborate on the role that the deposit insurance system is
called to play among the other components of ﬁnancial safety net in order to both prevent a
crisis and act post factum in cleaning up the eﬀects of bankruptcy or systemic crisis.
It is structured into ﬁve chapters, each approaching a diﬀerent aspect of deposit insurance
system as market construct which is to be overhauled under the pressure of recent developments.
The ﬁrst chapter investigates the short-term and long-term impact of the exceptional mea-
sures applied in the context of crisis and the possibilities to review the setup of deposit insurance
schemes. The second one approaches the role that the government has to play in the market-
place in order to deliver ﬁnancial stability and preserve the depositors’ interest in the national
market.
The dilemma liquidity vs. solvency is dealt with in the third chapter from the perspective
of the central bank that acts in its capacity of lender of last resort to commercial banks. While
the selective liquidity injection is a post factum measure made by the monetary authority, a
pro-active action consists in creating a risk-based contribution to deposit insurance scheme. It
is the forth chapter that tackles this issue and sets out a proposal to set up a risk-sensitive
contribution system.
The next chapter delivers a few considerations about the current practice in calibration of
deposit insurance fund and ﬁnancing mechanisms in place. The correct set of its necessary level
is crucial to enable it to cope with the depositors’ claims in any isolated case of bankruptcy but
also in extreme market conditions of the nature of the crisis underway.
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The last chapter puts together the conclusions and proposals of potentially applicable mea-
sures in order to improve the set-up and functioning of deposit insurance systems to the beneﬁt
of all stakeholders.
The issues touched upon by this article are addressed to regulators, bankers and decision-
makers in macroeconomic policies, as they are all responsible for the stability and soundness
of banking institutions, thus interested in the adequate setup of national deposit insurance
schemes and ﬁnancial safety nets at large.
The deposit insurance scheme is not a stand-alone instrument, but an important part of a
consistent and articulated system of tools used to ensure the banking system safety. Together
with the sound regulatory framework, supervisory infrastructure, clear status of lender of last
resort of national bank and well-established bankruptcy institution, the deposit insurance is an
important gear in the ﬁnancial market construct.
While the quality of safety nets is usually proven by their capacity to prevent crises, the role
of deposit insurance is to protect depositors in case of bankruptcy which may occur in normal
market conditions and strike an individual bank, but also at times of crisis when the whole
banking system is being threatened by solvency problems
1.
International experience shows that deposit insurance is eﬀective at times of relative normal-
ity in the banking system. In periods of crises its capacity is severely impaired and the crisis
becomes primarily a ﬁscal problem (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane & Leaven, 2006). Governments
come under severe public pressure and resort to extended or even unlimited coverage of indi-
viduals’ deposits placed with banks. Sometimes, the cover goes beyond commercial banks and
encompasses other ﬁnancial institutions in the attempt to avert generalized panic on domestic
market.
2. Short-term vs. Long-term Approach
The current crisis led the decision-makers to adopt an array of short-time solutions aimed
at relieving the pressure from the capital markets and restoring the public conﬁdence in the
battered ﬁnancial system. In addition to the unpopular and tremendous fund injections into
ailing banks and across-the-board cuts in interest rates by central banks, the limits of deposit
insurance have been raised or even abolished for the deposits to be fully guaranteed.
The primary goals of this mechanism are to protect depositors
2 and contribute to banking
system’s stability by preventing bank runs.
Whenever rumors in the market arise about possible troubles experienced by a speciﬁcb a n k ,
deposit withdrawals are the unavoidable consequence. Hence, its real or alleged problems can
result in a solvency issue and the deposit insurance come into play if the bank goes bankrupt.
In such a case, the procedures on the access to the fund’s resources turn out to become a
restructuring or closing tool.
The long-standing contentious issue of the safety brake provided by any deposit insurance
system is that related to its adverse eﬀects on banks’ behavior. Encouraged by the existence of
the insurance which guarantees the indemniﬁcation of small depositors in case of default, banks
may be tempted to take on unreasonably huge risks in their search for higher proﬁt. Such a
1The components of national safety net interact irrespective of liquidity or solvency problems encountered by
banks. Ante factum all these components come into play to prevent both liquidity and solvency problems. The
national bank’s role as lender of last resort is to step in whenever an individual bank comes through liquidity
squeeze. Post factum, it is the deposit insurance that provides compensation in case of insolvency.
Small and medium-size account owners are targeted by the deposit insurance schemes, as they are deemed
to be at a disadvantage with large depositors due to their lower expertise to correctly understand the available
information. Additionally, it is the small depositors’ category that is the most aﬀected by the information
asymmetry.
2Small and medium-size account owners are targeted by the deposit insurance schemes, as they are deemed
to be at a disadvantage with large depositors due to their lower expertise to correctly understand the available
information. Additionally, it is the small depositors’ category that is the most aﬀected by the information
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behavior, commonly addressed to as moral hazard, undermines the credibility of banking system
and threatens ultimately the economic stability at large.
Small depositors, who usually hold savings below the guaranteed level, will have little concern
to carefully scrutinize their banks. As they will be surely reimbursed
3 if their depositor bank
goes bankrupt, the control they are entitled to is close to zero while the yield received is not
checked for proper correlation with potential risks the bank takes on. Banks, in their turn,
perceive the deposit insurance umbrella as an invitation to additionally venture the resources
they draw and are tempted to take on higher risks.
The proper calibration of insurance level is critical to the eﬀectiveness of any deposit insur-
ance scheme. Although the moral hazard is present on both depositors and banks sides, the
evidence shows that the higher the cover provided under such a scheme
4,t h eg r e a t e rt h emoral
hazard induced by banks’ adventurous behavior. On the other hand, if the cover is set too low,
it will turn out to be ineﬀective, as it falls short on its main role to prevent bank runs.
It is incumbent on regulators to determine an adequate level of deposit protection so as to
strike the balance between the need of eﬀective protection of depositors and the prevention of
moral hazard.
At the end of the year 2008 when the looming crisis threatened the stability of national
banking systems around the world, the preferred panacea in some countries was to adopt the
unlimited deposit cover. Other jurisdictions took a more prudential stance relative to the risk
of moral hazard and adjusted upwards the coverage limits instead of unlimited coverage.
Table I. Breakdown of limits for bank deposit coverage








Austria EUR 20,000 Unlimited Adopted in October 20085.
Belgium EUR 20,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Czech Republic EUR 25,000 EUR 50,000 Adopted in December 20086.
Denmark DKK
300,000
Unlimited Adopted in October 2008.
Finland EUR 25,000 EUR 50,000 Adopted in October 2008.






Unlimited Adopted in October 2008.
Greece EUR 20,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Hong Kong HKD
100,000
Unlimited Adopted in October 2008.
3The level of deposit recovery by depositors varies across the safety net arrangements. It may provide
unlimited cover (as recently decided in countries like Ireland, Iceland, Germany, etc.), a capped cover or a co-
insurance scheme (depositors who hold excessive deposits will bear partly the costs in case of depositor bank’s
bankruptcy).
4The limits are set in general to cover the vast majority of small depositor’s balances. Large deposits of
individuals together with corporate and interbank deposits are not covered but abide by market rules.
5From 2010 on the limit will be EUR 100,000.
6As compared with previous system where the insurance run up to 90% of deposits, the cover is now 100%
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Hungary HUF 6 mil. HUF 13 mil. Adopted in October 20087.
Iceland EUR 20,887 Unlimited Adopted in October 20088.






Japan JPY 10 mil. JPY 10 mil. Status quo.
Korea KRW 50 mil. KRW 50 mil. Status quo.
Luxembourg EUR 20,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Netherlands EUR 40,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Norway NOK 2 mil. NOK 2 mil. Status quo.
Poland EUR 22,000 EUR 50,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Portugal EUR 25,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Romania EUR 50,000 EUR 20,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Russia RUB 400,000 RUB 700,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Singapore SGD 20,000 Unlimited Adopted in October 200810.
Slovak Republic EUR 20,000 Unlimited Adopted in October 200811.
Spain EUR 20,000 EUR 100,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Sweden SEK 250,000 SEK 500,000 Adopted in October 2008.
Switzerland CHF 30,000 CHF 100,000 Adopted in November 2008.
Turkey YTL 50,000 YTL 50,000 Status quo12.
United Kingdom GBP 35,000 GBP 50,000 Adopted in October 200813.
United States USD 100,000 USD 250,000 Adopted in October 200814.
Source: OECD and public information from websites of national monetary authorities.
Table I provides a breakdown of bank deposit coverage limits in some countries as of end-
December 2008. As evidenced, the solutions adopted vary widely across countries. While the
most troubled opted to provide blanket covers, others increased the ceiling of deposit insurance
guarantee. A small group of countries15 maintained the same level they had before the crisis
broke out. Nevertheless, the afore-mentioned measures are temporary remedies addressing the
7Pending the Parliament approval, the limit will be raised to HUF 15 million starting with June 30, 2009.
8Although the Act no. 98 / 1999 on Deposit Guarantee was not changed, the blanket guarantee was intro-
duced by Government from October 2008. It covers all retail and corporate deposits in domestic commercial
and savings banks and their branches in Iceland.
9The temporary guarantee that covers deposits, covered bonds, senior and subordinated debt held in the six
biggest Irish banks is set to get terminated in September 2010.
10The Government pledged to temporarily guarantee all deposits denominated in SGD and foreign currency
owned by individuals, non-banking clients, ﬁnance companies and commercial banks licensed by the Singapore
Monetary Authority. The blanket guarantee is valid until December 31, 2010.
11The guarantee covers all deposits of individuals and small companies with commercial banks.
12If the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund is called in to administer a bank before it collapses, all deposits
held by private individuals are covered and not just up to the YTL 50,000 limit.
13The Government announced it would cover 100% of deposits with a bankrupt bank, although there is no
legally binding pledge in this respect.
14The guarantee is given per depositor per bank and is valid until the end of 2009.
15The rationale for deposit insurance ceiling preservation is the comfortable level which provide reasonable
protection to the most depositors in mature banking systems (Italy, France etc.) or the recent experience
which turned out to have been helped the set of an adequate coverage limit. The latter case is illustrated by
Turkey which introduced the unlimited deposit insurance in 1994 after the collapse of three national banks.
But the 100% guarantee led many banks to engage in risky undertakings. In 2001 a banking crisis broke out
in Turkey and many banks were seized. The market authority resorted to deep changes in the banking system
workings. The unlimited coverage of deposits was abolished in 2004 and Turkey aligned its regulations with the
EU guidelines.DEPOSIT INSURANCE 59
eﬀects and by no means the deep roots of crisis. To reach the target of real depositors’ protec-
tion while preserving ﬁnancial stability, the far-reaching change in regulatory and supervisory
framework emerges as the only reasonable solution with long-standing and across-the-board
beneﬁts.
3. Government as Stakeholder: Stand-alone vs. Concerted Initiatives
To mitigate the moral hazard risk while reducing the total cost of a crisis for government,
the market discipline must be quickly restored. Depositors have an important role to clean up
the market by shifting their savings from banks perceived as riskier to the safer ones.
The regulatory authorities are the key stakeholder because they have to design and implement
a reliable regulatory and supervisory framework to enable the market forces come into play as
quickly as possible.
The measures taken in the recent turmoil to increase the coverage level or even to oﬀer un-
limited deposit guarantee needs credibility and a good argument here is a clear commitment
related to the so-called exit strategy. These measures cannot last forever and a phasing-out
timetable is necessary although the duration of the crisis is highly unpredictable. A realis-
tic approach here would be to correlate the milestones in the phasing-out plan with a set of
indicators relevant for the improvement in the ﬁnancial market.
By way of regulatory arbitrage, diﬀerences in treatment across jurisdictions give rise to the
risk of deposits’ migration from countries with lower limits of deposit guarantees towards those
with higher guarantees or unlimited coverage. The ﬂight to safety attitude can be hindered
only by restrictions in the exchange rate regime.
Currently, with the widespread removal of barriers and the free movement of capitals across
countries, enhanced depositors protection is equivalent to temporarily creating a comparative
regulatory advantage. In Europe, governmental guarantees for deposits and depositor protection
schemes may fall under the EU state aid rules16.
While useful to sort out the ﬁnancial turmoil, these measures add to the moral hazard risk
and make the exit more diﬃcult once the troubles were overcome.
Banking regulations enforced across EU stipulate a diﬀerent treatment of banks’ branches
authorized to operate in a diﬀerent member country17 and the asymmetry can also generate
problems by way of unfair competition. Furthermore, the market ineﬃciency can result in a
ﬂawed depositors’ protection.
Under EU Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, depositors of a bank’s foreign
branch operating in a host country are protected according to the rules of the home country
where the mother bank is authorized. If the latter one is a member of the European Economic
Area, the minimum deposit protection comes to EUR 50,000 since October 2008 and is to
increase to EUR 100,000 as of January 2010. In case the host country adopted a higher deposit
insurance limit or lifted it temporarily, the branches of foreign banks cannot be forced to
participate in the additional insurance schemes of local market. As the depositors are usually
not aware of that, they run the risk of partial losses. The other way round, domestic banks
covered by the additional scheme can capitalize on the likely shift in public option and draw
additional deposits.
Against the background of crisis, some governments introduced extended guarantees beyond
individuals’ deposits, to include other forms of savings and other types of ﬁnancial companies18.
Such measures evidence the commitment of authorities to prevent panic, particularly in mature
16The blanket coverage oﬀered to depositors in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland and Slovak
Republic was reported to the European Commission as such.
17T h e r em a yb et h ec a s eo fd i ﬀerent levels of deposit insurance, as the banks’ foreign branches fall within
the legislation of the mother bank’s home country.
18In October 2009 USA’s FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) extended the cover scheme to
deposits of small business. Almost concomitantly, the Australian government introduced a three-year guarantee
for all deposits made with the domestic banks, credit unions and building companies.60 ANTOANETA GEAL˘ A
markets where a wide range of saving & investment instruments were made available to public.
While helpful to deliver security to depositors and investors over a relatively brief time, they
e n du pf o s t e r i n gi n e ﬃciency in public expenses and moral hazard.
Although the deposit insurance scheme is an eﬀective tool to provide the depositors the sense
of safety, its failure to deliver the promised indemniﬁcation has a broad negative impact on the
market and undermines ultimately the authority of the state and its institutions19.
4. The Lender of Last Resort — Solution or Deep Root of Troubles
The issue of deposit insurance schemes has always elicited ﬁerce debates on its virtues and
shortcomings. Supporters insist on depositors’ protection and preservation of market conﬁdence,
important to enable banks carry out their functions of ﬁnancial intermediation. Critics stress
the moral hazard risk, arguing that it prompts banks to hunt for riskier business, as they are
secured that depositors will be indemniﬁed in case of bankruptcy. In their turn, depositors fuel
the hazardous behavior of banks as they prefer to make deposits with the most rewarding banks
that usually oﬀer above average interest rates due to their risk appetite.
The recent ﬁnancial turmoil revealed once again that the market conﬁdence is crucial for
commercial banks being able to function properly. Due to their heavy reliance on savings as
the cheapest source of funds, any market disruption pushes them to look for more expensive
alternatives on interbank market or to resort to the national bank, called in to play its role of
lender of last resort.
Liquidity has an overwhelming role in the ﬁnancial market nowadays and any adverse in-
formation is priced into the credit cost on every market segment. The information is almost
instantaneously spread across markets, as they are basically a system of communicating vessels.
Insuﬃciently tackled so far by the regulations in force, the liquidity risk turned out to become
crucial especially at times of ﬁnancial turbulence, when the market dries up of money. The
liquidity problems can result in bank runs and the troubles encountered by a particular bank,
if not adequately addressed, can quickly spill over and become a systemic issue. It is here that
the central bank usually gets involved in its capacity of lender of last resort. By its role to
provide temporary funds to the market, the central bank can relieve tensions and prevent panic
and further negative developments.
The new challenges facing the central banks were related to both market liquidity and ben-
eﬁciaries of emergency funding. Furthermore, the lender-of-last-resort function20 had to be
adapted to these changing circumstances (Davis, 2008).
T h ep r e r e q u i s i t ef o rt h el e n d e ro fl a s tr e s o r tf u n c t i o nt ob ef u l ﬁlled properly is a clear package
of rules where the central bank sets clearly the terms on which the emergency funding is made
available to banks. A large base of collateral increases the credit risk run by the central bank.
The value of liabilities in the balance sheet of the borrower may end up exceeding the real
value of collateral pledged. Due to the credit facility, commercial banks will expand as much
as possible the collateralization of their assets, hence decreasing the available assets for other
depositors and lending institutions.
In normal circumstances, a bank is reluctant to ask for emergency ﬁnancing because of the
negative impact and reputation damage. The looming risk associated with liquidity support
19The Russian Capital Credit Bank stopped the normal deposit withdrawals in December 2008. It was a
de facto insolvency although no oﬃcial statement from the Central Bank of Russia had been made. In spite
of depositors’ protests, the central bank, in charge with banking supervision, didn’t make any decision. A few
weeks later it withdrew the license of Capital Credit Bank and depositors were able to start the recovery of their
savings from the deposit insurance.
20The role of lender-of-last-resort was originally aimed at providing funds to solvent banks facing temporary
liquidity problems. However, this emergency funding bore a penalty rate and was granted against acceptable
collateral. It couldn’t be used for current lending operations but to fulﬁll the daily obligations in the interbank
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comes from its exceptional nature and the bank that resorts to such a tool to overcome a
temporary shortage of funds may carry a stigma (Mayes and Wood, 2007).
5. The Challenge of Risk-based Contribution
In current circumstances when the resources of deposit insurance institutions are being
strained, the funding becomes an issue of the utmost importance for its credibility. The most
systems have in place the ex ante mechanism where premiums are collected into a standalone
insurance fund that can be accessed to indemnify depositors when the case arises. The matter
at issue with this kind of arrangement is the inequitable set of premiums. Most countries set
ﬂat rates applied to the amount of insurable deposits, as it is easy to manage and has low
administration costs.
Table I oﬀers a picture of current premium settings in a selection of European countries
where the ﬂat rate is being used. Its main drawback is that it acts as a strong disincentive for
some contributors that have to pay the same rate irrespective of how risky they conduct their
business. The ﬂat rate gives rise to moral hazard, all member banks being covered in case of
default although the re-distribution is obviously unfair. Those that chase for higher proﬁto r
market share venturing excessively their funds and go bankrupt are covered from contributions
paid by prudent banks which accepted lower returns. A redesign of premium calculation based
on banks’ risk proﬁle gathers momentum as more and more regulators committed to strengthen
the prudential rules and put in place advanced early warning systems21. In addition to their
supervisory purpose, the risk indicators may be very well used in order to settle a fair system
of contributions to deposit insurance fund. The package of such indicators has to capture
adequate information on both assets & liabilities and their correlation. Such a risk-based
contribution system not only puts emphasis on preventing action, but also penalizes unsound
or risky practices of members.
The current reporting requirements provide reasonable data and indicators to facilitate the
design of a sound risk-sensitive premium calculation system. The upcoming Basel II Accord also
enforces reasonable reporting requirements and enhances transparency, so that a reform of de-
posit insurance system can be revamped to the beneﬁt of depositors, deposit-taking institutions
and taxpayers.
A possible solution consists in a panel of ﬁve indicators whose role is to provide an accurate
risk proﬁle of member institutions as a basis for fair calibration of premiums:
1. Solvency ratio22 is a core item of mandatory reporting framework and gives an indication
of the overall risk appetite and its correspondence with the capital cushion.
2. To capture the total risk run by a banking institution, the global risk ratio23 is a good
proxy for the overall business risk.
3. Credit risk ratio24 must be present in the panel of indicators applied to come out the
risk-based contribution. It can be built to capture the bank’s exposure coming from both
credit activity and placements with counterparties on monetary and ﬁnancial markets. The
risk degree in credit and placement areas impacts directly on the liquidity necessary to cope
with likely withdrawals from clients. The higher the ratio of poor quality credits & placements,
the lower the capacity to stand the depositors’ assails.
21Argentina, Canada, France, Taiwan, Turkey, USA have already in place risk-based contribution schemes
while other countries like Bulgaria are in advanced stages of implementation.
22The solvency ratio is deﬁned under Basel I and taken over as such by Basel II Accord. It represents the
ratio [Own Funds] / [Risk weighted assets (including oﬀ-balance sheet items)].
23The global risk ratio is deﬁned as the ratio [Risk weighted assets] / [Total assets]. The numerator and
denominator include oﬀ-balance sheet items converted into their asset equivalent.
24The proposed credit risk ratio is deﬁned as follows: [Gross loans + interbank investment (classiﬁed as
doubtful and loss)] / [Gross loans + interbank investments]. The gross exposure made up of banking and
non-banking loans and interbank investments includes the accrued interest. The denominator incorporates the
accrued interest as well. Both numerator and denominator cover the oﬀ-balance sheet items converted into their
asset equivalent.62 ANTOANETA GEAL˘ A
4. Liquidity ratio25 is to be considered in the calculation of contribution to deposit insurance
fund as it provides a very good indication as to how prompt a deposit-taking institution can
react to withdrawal requests and the preparedness to avert a potential bank run.
5. Return on assets (ROA) is worth using due to its wide applicability and relevance to
measuring the banking proﬁtability. The indicator was taken over by most national banking
supervisory authorities as part of CAMEL26 rating systems.
Attaching a rating scale ranging from 1 to 5 to each of the above-mentioned indicators,
depending on their signiﬁcance and relevance to the level of risk, along with an aggregation
rule, the regulators are in the position to set diﬀerentiating premiums corresponding to each
rating bracket.
Each of the above-mentioned indicators will have the range of possible values split into 5
brackets.
For solvency ratio, liquidity ratio and ROA, 1 is assigned to the lowest bracket (hence re-
ﬂecting the poorest performance) while 5 to the highest one.
As for the other indicators — global risk ratio and credit risk ratio — the scale is to be used
in the opposite way: the highest values in the last bracket are associated to higher risk and are
to be rated with 1, while the lowest values in the bracket designate a lower risk and get a the
grade 5.
Figure 1. Coverage ratio (insurable deposits/total deposits)
Source: IADI Surveys 2007.
Considering that the indicators have the same weight (20%), their weighted average will
determine the global rating of the bank. Based on this rationale, the more prudent and sound a
bank is the higher global rating it works out, but no more than 5. Hence, the reward it receives
is a lower contribution to the fund.
25The liquidity ratio can be calculated in various combinations. For the purpose of risk-based contribution
calculation to deposit insurance fund, an adequate solution could be to use a 7 days span. Hence, the liquidity
ratio represents [Short-term assets] / [Current accounts and term deposits]. Short-term assets include assets
maturing within 7 days. The denominator is made up of current account and term deposits owned by individuals.
26CAMEL is being used as rating system by national banks as an eﬀective supervisory tool (Capital adequacy,
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Although such a mechanism is not easy to manage and implies higher administration costs,
it can pave the way for enhanced transparency and banks’ accountability to deponents. It leads
additionally to an equitable distribution of contribution burden among the fund members.
Figure 2. Coverage limit/GDP per capita (times)
Source: IADI Surveys 2007.
Table II. Breakdown of limits for bank deposit coverage
in some European countries as of end-December 2008
Country Institutions covered Instruments covered















of deposit, foreign cur-
rency deposits.
Greece Commercial banks and cooperative
banks.
Savings accounts, check-
ing accounts, foreign cur-
rency deposits.
Poland Domestic banks as deﬁned by the Bank-
ing Act and branches of credit institutions
from the non-EU member states in case
they do not belong to any other guaran-
tee scheme or if the scheme they belong




of deposit, money or-
ders, foreign currency de-
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Romania All credit institutions authorized by NBR
to receive deposits from public. Follow-
ing Romania’s accession to the European
Union, the branches of foreign credit insti-
tutions headquartered in other EU mem-
ber states ceased to have the obligation
to participate in the Romanian deposit
guarantee scheme, but they may apply for










Commercial banks and Building societies. Savings accounts, certiﬁ-
cates of deposit, foreign
currency deposits.
Spain Credit institutions whose business is to
receive deposits or other repayable funds
from depositors in order to invest them.
Savings accounts, check-
ing accounts, certiﬁcates
of deposit and foreign
currency deposits.
Country Type of premium Premium & calculation base




Flat rate For banks and cooperative banks
= 0,1% of insured deposits in-
cluding accrued interest. For
bank building societies = 0,05%
of insured deposits including ac-
crued interest.
Greece The calculation of annual con-
tributions is based on a regres-
sive scale. The scale’s thresholds
revised each year by the Board
are so that the ratio of total an-
nual contributions to total de-
posits used for the calculation is
unchanged at the level of the ﬁrst
year of TEK’s operation.
Thresholds of deposit in EUR
millions (percent premium rate):
0 — 331.6 (0.1250%); 331.6 —
1,655.2 (0.1200%); 1,655.2 —
4,892.1 (0.1175%); 4,892.1 —
11,583.3 (0.0205%); over 11,583.3
(0.0025%).
Poland Flat rate Maximum 0.4% of insured de-
posits
Romania Flat rate. In addition, the Fund
is authorized to increase the an-
nual contribution to be paid by
a credit institution up to double
i f ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h er e g u l a t i o n si s -
sued by the Fund and to the pru-
dential regulations established by
the National Bank of Romania,
the respective credit institution
has engaged in risky and unsound
policies.




Flat rate 0.2 % of the amount of deposits
protected
Spain - -DEPOSIT INSURANCE 65
Country Funding Risk-based contributions
Bulgaria Premiums paid are the main source. In
emergency the funding comes from gov-
ernment, private markets. The Parlia-
ment approved an increase of premium
rate to 1.5% and collection of premiums
in advance.
Under development a
system based on risk-
adjusted contributions,
w h e r eq u a l i t a t i v ea n d
quantitative criteria will
be used to deﬁne the




Premium contribution is the main part.




Greece In principle ex-ante funding is used. If
such funding is not suﬃcient to compen-
sate depositors, ex-post funding may also
apply.
The annual contributions
paid by member institu-
tions are not diﬀerenti-
ated according to risks.
Poland Contributions are the source of funding.
They are assessed twice a year for ex post
funding and once a year for ex ante fund-
ing.
n/a
Romania The funding instruments are mixed
(mainly annual contributions of the mem-
ber credit institutions and stand-by lines
of credit granted yearly by the member
credit institutions; the latter could be
d r a w nd o w no n l yi nc a s eo fn e c e s s i t yo f
funds for paying compensations in the
event of the default of a member credit in-







Participants’ premiums are the primary
source. In emergency one can add govern-
ment funding and resources from private
markets.
n/a
Spain Premium paid by members are the main
source of funds. If needed the private mar-
kets can be accessed. When the assets
of the DIS become negative, the Manage-
ment Committee may agree to extraor-
dinary contributions being made by the
member institutions. The total extraor-
dinary amount may not exceed the sum
necessary to eliminate the deﬁcit.
n/a
Source: International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) Surveys.
6. Coverage Scope and Funding Mechanism
The ex ante ﬁnancing raises the question of adequate ratio between fund’s resources and
total insured deposits. As long as there is neither benchmark in the industry nor quantitative
target, the national regulators follow the track records and try to strike the balance between
the need to protect depositors and that of delivering ﬁnancial stability. According to OECD
statistics, the insurance funds ranges from a few decimal points of a percent up to 10 percent of66 ANTOANETA GEAL˘ A
total deposits. The same lack of consensus exists in terms of ratio of insured deposits to total
deposits.
Figure 1 gives evidence of the large spectrum of options as displayed by the data gathered27
from a selection of EU countries. While Poland keeps a low coverage ratio (33%), others go to
upper ceilings: Czech Republic has a ratio of 86% and Norway 85%.
Table II sets out a breakdown by country where it is easily noticeable that the diﬀerences
are rather small. In fact, the core of guaranteed instruments is fairly the same as long as the
remaining part plays a marginal role in terms of amounts.
The crisis put the funding issue in the spotlight because the ex ante mechanism turned
out to be overwhelmed due to the unprecedented number of bankruptcies. Almost all deposit
insurance funds have in place explicit borrowing agreements to get emergency funding from
governments. Due to additional pressure on public ﬁnances induced by the ﬁnancial turmoil
and dismal market conditions, the governments’ capacity to supply generous amounts to deposit
insurance funds ended up being questioned.
Figure 2 shows by how many times the insurance limit exceeds the GDP/capita in a panel
of new EU members. These countries tried to comply with the EC directives which set the
minimum guaranteed amount to EUR 20,00028 before the crisis. The low level of GDP/capita
led in some cases to better cover: in Bulgaria the guarantee covered 4.3 times the GDP/capita,
in Romania 3.1 times. The changes operated in order to contain the crisis i.e. higher or
unlimited cover correlated with weaker public ﬁnances led to ﬁscal problems. They are, in fact,
the result of ad hoc measures that didn’t consider the liquidity squeeze on the markets and
put in jeopardy the governments’ capacity to make good on their pledge to provide for the
announced implicit or explicit guarantees.
The international coordination might be a solution to prevent a crisis of conﬁdence, by
either bilateral or multilateral insurance arrangements set up in normal market circumstances.
A deposit insurance system in EU is a possible solution to support the troubled European
ﬁnancial sector and avoid regulatory arbitrage.
7. Conclusions
The severe stress that ﬁnancial markets are currently facing can be addressed by emergency
measures consisting inter alia in increased protection of depositors and other creditors, as
key component of a comprehensive master-plan at macroeconomic level with strong focus on
monetary and ﬁscal initiatives.
An eﬀective deposit insurance system must strike the balance between short-term and long-
term objectives while supporting the general eﬀo r tt ob u i l du pas o u n dﬁnancial system with
functional market discipline.
The unfolding ﬁnancial turmoil — spread with diﬀerent pacing and intensity on markets all
over the world — brought together a critical mass of lessons to guide the overhaul on deposit in-
surance arrangements to the beneﬁt of all stakeholders, from depositors and banks to regulatory
& supervisory authorities, governments and taxpayers at large.
1. Any deposit insurance system redesign must contribute to the accomplishment of macro-
economic policies i.e. bring in ﬁnancial stability by credibility and reasonable costs. On the
one hand, it has to provide protection for the payments system. While the blanket coverage
targets the best this objective particularly in a crisis, the government must set a reasonable
time-limit when such a shield has to be abolished. Otherwise it nurtures the moral hazard
and the credibility of the whole construct is in jeopardy. On the other hand, the protection of
27Data reﬂect the coverage ratios as at December 2007 and are aimed at evidencing normal market conditions.
The across-the-board measures adopted in October 2008 due to the ﬁnancial turmoil changed tremendously the
situation.
28The common practice across the world is to have guaranteed amounts ranging from 2 to 3 times of
GDP/capita. The selected EU countries were analyzed based on the regulation in force in December 2007,
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small depositors, actually the basic function of any deposit insurance, is comfortably fulﬁlled
by setting a proper coverage limit. In fact, this limit is a big challenge for policymakers. If set
too low, it cannot serve the purpose of securing the ﬁnancial stability. The other way round,
an unreasonably high limit prompts banks towards risky behaviors and blunts the depositors’
vigilance.
2. In terms of compliance with the principle of fair contribution to the insurance fund, a
risk-based premium calibrated to accurately capture the risk appetite of banks is increasingly
attractive for both regulators and members of deposit insurance system.
It helps prudent banks avoid unnecessary costs and discourages the unsound or risky policies
by higher premiums. However, the identiﬁcation of risk proﬁle is a sensitive issue. The indicators
selected to calibrate the contribution must be relevant to the specter of risks that can jeopardize
the capacity of banks to meet depositors’ withdrawal requests. They should cover fairly all the
signiﬁcant risks run by banks and ideally be picked up from the risk reports already in place.
Financial authorities use a complex system of indicators to perform their supervisory functions
and build up a comprehensive database where both risk and proﬁtability are being recorded.
The panel of indicators proposed in chapter 4 is a proposal which pursued the criteria of
relevance and availability, as a starting point towards a more equitable setup of contributions
to the deposit insurance fund.
A future research based on historical records can reveal the potential improvements in order
to better capture the risk proﬁle of banks, by including new indicators or giving up those
which turn out to have little relevance to purpose. Furthermore, the system proposed can
be ﬁne-tuned by assigning diﬀerent weights to the indicators in the panel in order to develop
an accurate global risk indicator used to correctly work out the contributions to the deposit
insurance fund.
3. Closely related to the deposit insurance tool, the market needs a proper set of lender of
last resort function to enable the central bank intervene in the stage of liquidity squeeze and
supply the solvent bank(s) facing temporary liquidity shortage the needed funds to go back on
track. We witnessed lately an overhaul on lender of last resort function which had to address the
market failure. As central banks were called in to inject funds into the market when allegedly
sound banks and other ﬁnancial institutions came across severe liquidity shortage, the classical
lender of last resort concept has been fundamentally revised.
The intricate relationship between this role bestowed on central bank and the deposit insur-
ance scheme is being challenged against the background of ﬁnancial turmoil that made it more
diﬃcult to draw the line between liquidity and solvency problems.
4. An eﬃcient system of early warning indicators is to be established in order to enable the
central banks to detect the nature of problems that a particular bank may encounter. Should
the last resort lender provide with liquidity a bank with severe problems which subsequently
goes insolvent, it makes actually an adverse selection at the expense of depositors of the other
banks as they have lower funds available.
The quality of collateral was usually lowered and the additional funding pushed banks to
further take high risks. At the end of the day one cannot say that the ﬁnancial market problems
are properly addressed as long as the funds injected into the banking system can be subsequently
channeled towards risky transactions increasing de facto the risk faced by depositors.
5. Along with the lender of last resort function, the regulatory & supervisory infrastructure
must be enhanced and the bankruptcy institution enabled to properly play its role. Instead
of relaxing the access conditions to liquidity facility, central banks together with other market
institutions have to enhance their tools to better perform the supervisory functions and avoid
liquidity / solvency dilemma.
In the end, the issue of deposit insurance system shouldn’t be approached isolated but in
connection with the other components of national safety nets. Furthermore, the national con-
nections tend to be dismantled to the beneﬁt of international cooperation, as the globalization
set forth new and unexpected challenges amid a changing ﬁnancial landscape.68 ANTOANETA GEAL˘ A
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